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Introduction
In a frictionless world, arbitrage should produce perfectly elastic financial asset demand curves. In practice, however, the literature has identified potentially important frictions capable of inducing downward-sloping demand curves for individual securities. Asset substitution may be less than perfect when would-be arbitragers face internal or counterparty restrictions limiting leveraged trading of large positions. Individual traders may also possess different information about future cash flows or else interpret common information in alternative ways. The existence of either significant limits to arbitrage or heterogeneity of investor beliefs is consistent with the extant empirical literature's conclusion that demand functions for financial assets slope downward.
The bulk of the financial asset demand literature studies equity markets in a crosssectional setting. We extend this literature along two dimensions. First, we examine discount notes issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System, a large government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) chartered by Congress in 1932 to provide liquidity to home mortgage lenders.
Compared to the typical equity security, the demand for these very high quality short-term debt securities should be much less affected by both information-based frictions and leverage constraints. Second, we observe time variation in the demand for FHLB discount notes between 1999 and 2008, with a special focus on the financial crisis beginning in August 2007.
In sharp contrast to previous results for equity securities, we find that the demand curve for FHLB discount notes is nearly perfectly elastic during normal market conditions. The point estimate for our baseline pooled sample is -45,500, which is one-to-four orders of magnitude higher than estimates for individual equities from the existing literature. We also find that this demand elasticity is time-varying and that it decreased significantly after the onset of the financial crisis. Such a crisis impact on FHLB debt demand might not be entirely surprising since GSE debt carries only an "implicit" U.S. government guarantee and the onset of a general financial crisis may affect the perceived risk of these assets. Using a framework inspired by Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) , we investigate whether an estimated decrease in the elasticity of demand for FHLB discount notes after August 2007 was related to observed increases in arbitrage risk and/or heterogeneity of investor beliefs. We find support for both of these conjectures.
As one of the largest dollar-denominated debt issuers, FHLB debt is worthy of study in its own right. However, its particular appeal for estimating financial asset demand is a unique dataset resulting from 2,910 discount note auctions held by the FHLB System's Office of Finance. This dataset contains pre-auction dealer rate indications that, for a given expected auction size, summarize each auction morning's market conditions. We compare these rate indications for the expected auction size with the corresponding auction rate results for the actual auction size. Assuming rational expectations, our dataset identifies two distinct points on the market demand schedule associated with each discount note auction that took place between January 1999 and June 2008. The unique nature and large quantity (an order of magnitude larger than those used in previous studies) of our data enhances statistical precision and alleviates endogeneity concerns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature and institutional setting. Section 3 describes and presents summary statistics for our data. Section 4 presents our main empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Background

Related literature
There have been five main approaches to estimating the elasticity of demand for equities.
Each of these approaches investigates whether a particular type of shock to excess demand generates significant return responses in a cross-sectional setting. Shocks studied include: (1) secondary equity distributions (Scholes, 1972; Mikkelson and Partch, 1985) , (2) block trades (Kraus and Stoll, 1972) , (3) stock repurchases (Bagwell, 1992) , (4) initial public offerings (Kandel, Sarig, and Wohl, 1999) , and (5) additions and/or re-weightings of stock indices (Shleifer, 1986) . 1 All of the studies find some evidence of price impacts of their selected shock.
However, these results may be attributable to contemporaneous revelations of information about firm value.
2 Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) attempt to address this endogeneity issue by exploiting a presumably uninformative change in the weightings of the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index to identify their price-insensitive demand shift and find evidence of downward sloping demand curves for stocks.
Extending this literature, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) argue that near-perfect substitutes for individual stocks do not exist and that unexplained return variance (a measure of "arbitrage risk") is an important determinant of cross-sectional variation in the elasticity of demand for equities. The authors re-examine individual stock additions to the S&P 500 stock index and report significantly steeper demand curves for stocks with higher levels of arbitrage 1 See also Garry and Goetzmann (1986) , Harris and Gurel (1986) , Dillon and Johnson (1991) , Beneish and Whaley (1996) , Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) , and Kappou, Brooks and Ward (2010) , among others, for US stock index data and Chakrabarti et al. (2005) for international evidence. Hau, Massa and Peress (2010) present evidence that a December 2000 reweighting of the MSCI international equity index affected exchange rates.
2 For example, positive return impacts of stock index additions may reflect the index provider's certification of "good news" for a newly added company's prospects (Denis et al., 2003) .
risk. Greenwood (2005) also uses a limits-to-arbitrage setting and finds large price impacts from a unique redefinition of Japan's Nikkei 225 index.
The elasticity of demand for debt securities has received much less attention. 3 Kamara (1994) provides some evidence of a downward-sloping demand curve for short-term Treasury notes based upon tax-related differential pricing of Treasury notes and bills. Other debt market studies in finance have focused on relative pricing of on-the-run versus off-the-run Treasury securities, especially in the context of analyzing impacts on value due to differences in liquidity and the degree of repurchase agreement market "specialness." 4 Krishnamurthy and VissingJorgensen (2008) examine a possible convenience yield component of demand for aggregate US Treasury debt. They find evidence of a downward-sloping demand curve using an instrumental variables approach under the critical assumption that the ratio of total US Treasury debt to US gross domestic product is exogenous.
A significant literature analyzes bidding strategies in fixed-size auctions of new debt issues. These studies compare auction outcomes with secondary market pricing, but their data do not contain a contemporaneous shift in supply necessary to identify the slope of a demand curve.
However, these studies do present related evidence on the question of whether auction size influences auction outcomes. Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002) and Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist (2005) find little sensitivity between government debt auction price outcomes and issue size. These results are consistent with near perfectly elastic demand.
3 A large related body of work on Ricardian equivalence exists in the economics literature (e.g. Seater, 1993) . 4 See, for example, Jordan and Jordan (1997) , Krishnamurthy (2002) and Sundaresan and Wang (2009) .
The Federal Home Loan Bank System
The FHLB System is a major issuer in the dollar-denominated debt market, yet it has been largely neglected in the academic finance literature. 5 The FHLB System consists of 12 cooperatively owned wholesale banks designed to support housing finance and community development. FHLB members/owners may be commercial banks, thrifts, credit unions, or insurance companies. The FHLB System acts as a source of liquidity for the more than 8,100
individual financial institutions via collateralized loans called "advances. Ashcraft, Bech and Frame (2010) summarize the FHLB System's special GSE privileges as incorporating (1) a provision authorizing the Treasury Secretary to purchase up to $4 billion of FHLB securities, (2) the treatment of System debt as "government securities" under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, (3) the statutory ability to use the Federal Reserve as its fiscal agent, and (4) an exemption from the bankruptcy code by way of being considered "federal instrumentalities."
Nevertheless, the financial health of individual FHLBs may differ and this is reflected in their derivatives counterparty credit ratings.
FHLBs borrow daily using a variety of methods to provide liquidity for their members.
Discount notes, with maturities up to one year, are issued through regularly scheduled auctions and a "discount note window." The FHLB System also issues a variety of longer-maturity bonds.
All debt issuance and servicing is executed by the Office of Finance, a joint FHLB System facility. <Insert Figure 1 here> Ashcraft, Bech and Frame (2010) conclude that during the crisis large member institutions used FHLB advances to fund increases in their trading books, federal funds and repo lending, and non-mortgage lending most likely tied to customer drawdowns of outstanding lines of credit. They interpret the FHLB System as having provided a "lender-of-next-to-last-resort" 8 See Sundaresan and Wang (2009) for additional background on such Y2K-related market uncertainties.
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
The FHLB discount note auction process
Discount notes are auctioned on Tuesday and Thursday of each week. The FHLBs typically auction discount notes with four standardized maturities: 4-weeks, 9-weeks, 13-weeks and 26-weeks. We focus on the 4-week, 9-week and 13-week maturities since they account for about 94% of the amounts auctioned. 9 Only members of the FHLB System's dealer selling group may bid. Bids are expressed as discount rates and entered via an electronic platform. This platform also determines the results of each auction and processes the winning bids through until settlement. As a byproduct, this platform also captures all of the data that we are using in this study.
To help guide the individual regional bank funding decisions, the Office of Finance elicits a set of "indications" from each of the dealers in its selling group. Between 9:30 and 11:00 AM on the morning of each auction day, the selling group dealers submit their projections for achievable auction rates. Because the actual size of the auction will not be determined until 11:36 AM, the dealers cannot condition their rate indications on the actual auction size. However, the Office of Finance does give the dealers an auction size range indication (e.g., say, $3 billion to $5 billion). Each dealer communicates a projected achievable auction rate range (say, 2.99% to 3.01%) back to the Office of Finance.
The Office's trading desk uses the dealer indications to produce an official desk 3-basis point rate range that is communicated to the 12 regional FHLBs. The regional banks price their advances (loans) to their own member institutions off of this desk indication. Based upon all of 9 The 26-week discount note auctions are the smallest in average size (just under $500 million) and the most likely to be cancelled. In particular, 102 (10.4%) of the 985 26-week discount note auctions scheduled during our sample period were cancelled. In contrast, the only 4-week auctions cancelled during our sample decade were those for Tuesday, September 11, 2001 and Thursday, September 13, 2001. this information, each regional bank determines its desired issuance quantity of each maturity and communicates these amounts to the Office of Finance by 11:31 AM. Between 11:31 AM and 11:36 AM, the Office of Finance reviews and then sums up all of the individual amounts ordered by the 12 regional banks. At 11:36 AM, the Office of Finance determines the size of each maturity's discount note auction and communicates those sizes to the dealers.
After the 11:36 AM announcement of the auction sizes, dealers may begin to submit their bids. Only members of the FHLB System's dealer selling group may bid in an auction. Thus, any non-member becomes a "customer" and must route its bid through a selling group dealer. Bids consist of a specific par amount at a specific discount rate. Dealers may submit multiple bids.
Bids are accepted until 12:10 PM. The auction results are then determined and promptly communicated to the market. The results released to the market are the auction's all-in weighted average discount rate (WAR); the highest all-in discount rate accepted (the "Stop"); the percent of dealer bids accepted at the stop rate; and the ratio of the total par amount bid to the auction's issue size (the "Cover").
Recall that the dealers' rate indications are submitted prior to the Office of Finance's determination of any auction's actual size. This generates a unique data structure relevant for estimating the elasticity of discount note demand. In particular, for each day's auction, the Office of Finance records summary statistics for two distinct points on the market demand schedule. We base the first rate-quantity pair upon the average of the midpoints of the rate ranges indicated by the group of dealers and the mid-point of that day's assumed auction size range. We base the second rate-quantity pair on the actual auction rate result for that auction's actual issue size. These two rate-quantity pairs permit us to estimate the average discount rate response to variation in quantity (i.e., the slope of the demand curve) by relating the difference between the actual auction rate result and the morning's indicated rate (the "rate spread") to the difference between the actual auction size and the morning's assumed size (the "auction size adjustment"). Figure 3 illustrates the basic research design in discount note issue price-quantity space.
Here, the n-day-to-maturity discount note issue price (P) is a linear function of a given percentage discount rate (R): P = 100 × {1-[R × (n÷360]}. Figure 3 presumes that the cumulative bid curve for any auction depends on the auction's size. The light black solid line and its companion curve represent the indicated auction size and its associated cumulative bid curve. The heavy black solid line and its companion curve represent a "large" auction size and its associated cumulative bid curve. We use stars to represent the clearing price-quantity pairs for each auction. The clearing price is lower in the larger-sized auction (because the auction-clearing rate result is higher). We interpret the starred outcome for the indicated auction size (S Indicated ) as one price-quantity pair using the average of the midpoints of the dealers' indicated rate ranges to compute the associated clearing price. A second price-quantity pair is represented by the starred outcome for the actual "large" auction size (S Large ) using a price based upon the actual auction rate result. In Figure 3 , we invoke rational expectations by assuming that (1) the market's average rate indication lies on the notional demand curve and (2) 
Data and summary statistics
Our dataset tracks activities at both the auction and dealer levels. The auction level data includes the auction dates, discount note issuance amounts, and auction rate results, including the weighted-average rate, the stop rate, and the lowest bid rate. The dealer level data consists of individual dealer rate indications for each auction. We use maturity-matched Treasury bill rates and LIBOR to benchmark money market rate levels. Table 1 summarizes the FHLB System's auction activity for our January 1999 to June 2008 sample period for 4-week, 9-week, and 13-week discount note maturities. Table 1 also clearly shows that average auction sizes during 2007 and, especially, 2008 are much higher than the full sample average size -owing to the heightened demand for FHLB advances during the crisis.
Summary statistics of FHLB discount note auctions
<Insert Table 1 here> The amounts of discount notes auctioned generally range from $500 million to over $5 billion for each maturity. The precise amount set for each auction depends on the FHLB System's funding needs on that particular day. opportunistic debt management strategy to a more regular and predictable issuance of couponbearing notes and bonds during the mid-1970s. The FHLB System's discount note auction calendar shares the "regular and predictable" aspect of US Treasury securities auctions regarding auction cycles and scheduled debt maturities (e.g., 4-week, 9-week, 13-week and 26-week 10 The coefficients of variation (standard deviation/mean) for FHLB auction size range from 0.6 to 0.8, while the same values for Treasuries range from 0.3 to 0.4. Also, the R-squares of naïve autoregressions with 1 to 4 lags are less than 50% for FHLB auction sizes and greater than 75% for Treasuries.
auctions are scheduled for every Tuesday and Thursday). However, the "final hour" notification of a FHLB discount note's auction size differs sharply from the usual one-day to one-week lag of security auction size announcements by the Treasury. Again, this time line allows the Office of Finance to set auction sizes that respond to the changing needs of the regional FHLBs that, in turn, can respond flexibly to member institutions' demand for advances.
11 Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics on dealer participation and award concentration. Again, the results are broken out for each of the three individual maturities. For example, for 4-week discount note auctions, the median number of dealers bidding is 16 and the median number of bids (of varying amounts) received by the Office of Finance is 63. The median cover ratio (defined as sum of bid amounts divided by total auctioned amount) of 3.64 reveals that the typical auction comfortably avoids the prospect of "failure" (i.e., not enough bids to absorb the announced auction size). Indeed, an understanding between the Office of Finance and its dealers stipulates that every dealer should bid at least its pro rata share of the auction.
The bidding interest shows significant auction-to-auction variation. In particular, the cover ratio for 4-week discount note auctions is positively skewed and ranges from a low of 1.31 to a high of 15.75. Finally, the 4-week auction "award concentration ratio" -defined by Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002) as the fraction of the awards captured by the five highest individual bids -averages 0.84 and ranges between 0.53 and 1.0. Thus, the FHLB System discount note auctions are not only much larger but also have much more highly concentrated awards than corresponding results from Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002) for Swedish
Treasury bill auctions, which average only 0.55 for 3-month bills.
11 In unreported tests, we do not find any significant statistical evidence indicating that the FHLB System tactically adjusts discount note auction sizes in response to US Treasury bill issuance. Thus, we fail to find an auction-size analog to Greenwood, Hanson and Stein's (2010) "gap-filling" theory of debt issuance.
<Insert Table 2 here>
Measures of arbitrage risk and heterogeneity of investor beliefs
The August 2007 to June 2008 period was characterized by a rapid change in discount note issuance amounts and yield spreads to benchmark assets. Hence, the onset of the financial crisis in August 2007 could impact the elasticity of demand for FHLB discount notes.
Furthermore, in the spirit of Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) , shifts in arbitrage risk and heterogeneity of investor beliefs could be the fundamental causes of any crisis-related change in FHLB discount note demand elasticity.
To test whether the response of auction rates to auction size adjustments depend upon arbitrage risk and the heterogeneity of investor beliefs, we must choose empirical proxies for these two factors. We use the cross-sectional dispersion of dealer rate indications as a measure of the heterogeneity of investor beliefs regarding fundamental asset value at the auction date.
Specifically, for each auction, we compute the cross-dealer standard deviation of the mid-point of the bid and ask rate indicated by each dealer.
We measure arbitrage risk as the estimated standard error of the residuals from rolling window regressions of first differences of FHLB discount note rates on corresponding changes in other money market rates for the same maturities. The residual rate changes can be viewed as changes in the value of arbitrage trading positions (i.e., positions in FHLB discount notes hedged by other money market positions). This residual standard error measure is a money market analog to idiosyncratic risk measures in Treynor and Black (1973) , Pontiff (1996 Pontiff ( , 2006 , Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002 ), Mendenhall (2004 ), and McLean (2010 . Table 3 presents results for regressions of the daily changes in 4-week, 9-week and 13-week FHLB discount notes rates on corresponding changes in benchmark rates over the full sample. Regression specification (1) uses LIBOR deposits as the benchmark asset; specification (2) uses Treasury bills as the benchmark asset; and specification (3) includes both LIBOR deposits and Treasury bills. All three specifications are relevant for the 4-week and 13-week FHLB discount notes. However, our 1-month Treasury bill rate data begins in July of 2001, so the sample size for the 4-week discount note regressions using specifications (2) and (3) is shorter than for the corresponding LIBOR benchmark regression. Moreover, we have no 2-month Treasury rate data, so the 9-week discount note rate regression is run using only specification (1). We also present results for subsamples split before and after August 2007.
Regardless of the specification used, the estimated regressions suggest significant positive relations between changes in FHLB discount note rates and changes in benchmark rates.
However, the results from all regressions also indicate that daily changes in FHLB discount note rates exhibit substantial variation that is unexplained by corresponding changes in benchmark rates. For example, the combination of LIBOR and Treasury bill rate changes explains less than 25% of the variation in daily changes in either 4-week or 13-week discount note rates suggesting that local supply and demand factors are important in discount note pricing. Thus, both the LIBOR deposits and Treasury bills are significantly less than perfect substitutes for FHLB discount notes (alone or in combination).
<Insert Table 3 here> Moreover, the degree to which the market might view either LIBOR deposits or Treasury bills as substitutes for FHLB discount notes worsened significantly after August 2007. The standard error of the residuals ("tracking error") after August 2007 is more than double that of the earlier sample period for all three versions of the 4-week maturity regressions. Standard tests strongly reject the hypothesis that the regression's residual variance is constant across the two sub-periods. We use the unexplained variation in first-differences of FHLB discount note rates to measure arbitrage risk as of each auction date. To calculate this unexplained variation across time we run rolling window regressions of daily changes in FHLB discount note rates on corresponding changes in LIBOR of the same maturities. We use a rolling three-month window.
The estimated standard error of the residuals from these rolling window regressions serves as our measure of arbitrage risk. Table 4 presents the mean and median differences between auction rates (either the weighted-average rate or the stop rate) and indicated rates. (As previously mentioned, the Office of Finance elicits a set of "indications" from each of the dealers in its selling group in the morning of each auction day.) We report separate statistics for auctions that turned out to be smaller in size than the indicated size range ("Smaller-than-Indicated"); auctions with sizes that lay within the indicated size range ("As Indicated"); and auctions that turned out to be larger in size than the indicated size range ("Larger-than-Indicated"). We also produce separate results for the pre-and post-August 2007 subsamples.
Size-related auction rate patterns
<Insert Table 4 here> Auction size seems to matter for auction pricing. In both panels, there is a monotone positive relation between indications-adjusted auction size and rate spread. Put differently, "larger than indicated" auctions generally have a positive effect on the differences between the realized rates (either the weighted-average rate or the stop rate) and indicated rates. These results obtain for all three discount note maturities and are robust across the two sub-periods.
However, the differences among the three categories are economically small, averaging about one basis point in rate difference between size categories in the pre-crisis period.
In Panel A, the spread in the "As Indicated" size subsample for 4-week discount note auctions over the pre-August 2007 period is -0.5 basis points whether measured as a mean or median. Thus, the average WAR for these 4-week discount note auctions is slightly lower than the average indications of the dealers. The results for the 9-week and 13-week auctions show a similar negative bias for the "As Indicated" subsample. During the Crisis period there is an increase in this bias for 4-week auctions (from -0.5 to -1.9), but not for the other maturities. One might expect that some degree of negative bias would be present in the data. Our dealer indication variable is an average indication across all contributing dealers, whereas the more aggressive dealers have a bigger impact ex post in determining any auction's WAR outcome.
Panel B shows that there is no such consistent negative bias for the "As Indicated" auctions when stop rates are used in place of WAR to define the spread. 12 In the main analysis we use WAR since it represents the achieved funding cost of the FHLB. As a robustness check, we also use the stop rate data in our estimation of elasticity. Table 5 presents results for three alternative regression specifications that measure the corresponding rate impacts of auction size variation for a pooled sample of 4-week, 9-week and 13-week FHLB discount note auctions including maturity fixed effects. The dependent variable in all three regression models is the difference between an auction's weighted-average rate (WAR) and the mean dealer indicated rate.
Estimating the slope of the demand curve
13
<Insert Table 5 here> Model (1) uses the auction size adjustment, defined as the difference between actual and indicated auction sizes in billions of dollars, as an independent variable along with an intercept term, an intercept "Crisis" dummy (equal to one beginning in August 2007 and zero prior to that month) and a corresponding slope interaction term. The test of the hypothesis that the size adjustment variable's slope coefficient equals zero examines whether the size adjustments observed over the sample have any impact on the FHLB's discount note rate results. For example, if market demand were perfectly elastic, then any additional auctioned quantity could be absorbed at the same rate that was indicated for the assumed supply. Alternatively, if demand were less than perfectly elastic, then the resulting WAR for an auction should be higher (lower) than the morning's indicated rate for any actual auctioned quantity that is "Larger-than- 13 In unreported analyses, we run regressions akin to those in Table 5 and 6 using auction stop rate instead of WAR.
Results about elasticity are very similar in nature to the reported tables suggesting that the indication bias discussed in Section 4.1 does not affect our conclusions about the slope of the demand curve.
Indicated" ("Smaller-than-Indicated"). The slope interaction term is designed to isolate differential effects of auction size adjustment on auction rates in the post-August 2007 period.
Model (2) incorporates each of the terms in model (1), but also adds arbitrage risk and the dispersion of rate indications in both levels form and also slope interaction terms for the auction size adjustment variable. These slope interaction terms allow our measures of arbitrage risk and heterogeneity of investor beliefs to change the auction size adjustment response coefficient. In this way, we test for the impacts of these variables on demand elasticity. Models (1) and (2) The results in Panel A of Table 5 provide statistical evidence that auction rates for FHLB System discount notes are positively related to the auction size adjustment. Using model (1), the size adjustment variable is significant at the 1% level. Nevertheless, the rate impact is small in magnitude and suggests that demand for FHLB discount notes is nearly perfectly elastic. The estimated slope coefficient for this pooled sample of auctions implies that an extra $1 billion of supply beyond the assumed amount increases the WAR by about 0.6 basis points over the average indicated dealer rate.
In model (1), the Crisis dummy interaction term for the size adjustment variable is positive and statistically significant. The interaction term suggests that the size adjustment impact on the rate spread variable increases from about 0.6 basis points to almost 1.0 basis point.
Thus, from the issuer's perspective, the marginal cost of additional auction size increases during a crisis.
Our tests using model (2) examine whether shifts in arbitrage risk and heterogeneity of investor beliefs were the fundamental causes of the crisis-related decreases in FHLB discount note demand elasticity implied by the model (2) estimates. Recall that our arbitrage risk measure is the tracking error from a rolling regression motivated by the horizon-matched LIBOR specification (1) from Table 3. 14 The estimates for model (2) in Panel A of The second approach, presented in Panel B of Table 5 , focuses on discount note percentage price responses to discount note percentage auction size adjustments. These regressions produce results that can be directly compared to those found in previous studies of financial asset demand elasticity. We calculate each auction's discount note price indication using the mean dealer rate indication and the corresponding discount note auction price using the weighted-average auction rate. 15 The dependent variable in all three regressions is the percentage difference between the actual auction price and the indicated price (expressed as a percentage change of the indicated price).
Model (1) between the actual amount and the indicated amount (expressed as a percentage change of the indicated amount). The test of the hypothesis that the slope coefficient equals zero examines whether the demand curve for discount notes is perfectly elastic at the indicated discount note price. Model (2) incorporates each of the terms in model (1), but also adds both tracking error and the dispersion of rate indications in both levels form and also in slope interaction terms for the percentage auction size adjustment variable.
The pooled sample results for model (1) in Panel B of Table 5 provide statistical evidence that demand for FHLB System discount notes is highly elastic, but also that demand elasticity decreased after August 2007. The interaction term suggests that the size adjustment impact on the price response variable roughly doubles after August 2007 (from about -0.020 to -0.037).
Thus, the post-August 2007 elasticity of demand decreased from -50,000 to about -27,000.
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Our tests using model (2) examine whether shifts in arbitrage risk and heterogeneity of investor beliefs were the fundamental causes of the crisis-related decreases in FHLB discount note demand elasticity implied by the model (1) estimates. The estimates for model (2) in Panel B strongly support the hypothesis that arbitrage risk is a statistically significant and economically important determinant of demand elasticity. The coefficients for interaction terms capturing arbitrage risk and heterogeneity of investor beliefs are each correctly signed, though only the arbitrage risk measure is statistically significant. Alternatively, using in model (3), both of the auction size interaction terms are statistically significant. The demand elasticity calculated using model (3) from Panel B falls from about -71,500 to -31,250 when tracking error is "high" and to -43,500 when the dispersion of dealer rate indications is "high." (3) regressions reveal significant coefficients for the tracking error-auction size adjustment interaction terms for all three maturities as well as significant coefficients for the dispersion of dealer rate indications-auction size interaction terms for the 9-week and 13-week maturities.
<Insert Table 6 here> Panel B of Table 6 presents the disaggregated results for the price change regressions.
The percentage auction size adjustment variable is statistically significant using model (1) for all three maturities. The results for model (1) (2) show large and significant impacts of arbitrage risk for all three discount note maturities. However, the Crisis dummy interaction term for the percentage auction size adjustment effect remains significant in model (2) for only the 4-week maturity. Finally, the model (3) regressions reveal significant coefficients for the auction size adjustment interaction terms for both the tracking error and dispersion of dealer rate indications for all three maturities. The implied elasticity of demand for the 4-week discount notes falls from -100,000 to about -55,500 for high levels of tracking error and to about -71,500 for high levels of the dispersion of dealer rate indications.
Our estimates reveal that demand for FHLB System discount notes is highly elastic. The point estimate for the pooled sample during the pre-August 2007 period is -50,000. This is more than an order of magnitude higher than the -3,000 estimate presented by Scholes (1972) for individual stocks and even more dramatically different from other more recent stock elasticity estimates that range from -1 to -37 (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002) . We also find that discount note elasticity can vary over time due to changes in macro-financial conditions. We find that the nearly 50% fall in discount note demand elasticity after August 2007 was largely due to concomitant rises in arbitrage risk and the heterogeneity of investor beliefs.
Addressing potential endogeneity concerns
Our estimation of demand elasticity depends crucially on the assumption that dealer valuations of FHLB discount notes are independent of the FHLB's auction size adjustments.
Violation of such an exogeneity assumption is a major concern with most studies of the demand elasticity for financial assets. An abnormal increase in the supply of a financial asset may result in a reduction of its price not only because of downward sloping demand, but also because the increase in supply could reveal negative information about the value of the asset and shift the entire demand curve downwards. In the case of FHLB discount note auctions, the auction size adjustment may provide dealers with information about the intrinsic value of FHLB's debt. In particular, the dealers may learn from the FHLB's auction size adjustment about the cost of bank funding in other channels and may therefore revise their perception of the fair price for the to-beauctioned notes. For example, an upward adjustment in issue size might signal that banks are having trouble raising funds by other means and lead dealers to raise their perception of the appropriate market-clearing discount rate. Such endogeneity could possibly bias our estimates of elasticity downward.
We perform a variety of econometric tests addressing potential endogeneity concerns.
Consistent with the assumptions outlined in Section 2.3, we do not find any evidence that the intrinsic value of FHLB debt is influenced by auction size adjustments. For that matter, there is also no evidence that auction size adjustments are influenced by dealer indications. We investigate whether auction size adjustments influence the intrinsic value of FHLB debt by analyzing intraday data on benchmark FHLB bond secondary market yields (as marked by the Office of Finance throughout the day). If such auction size adjustments truly do signal shifts in the fair cost of member bank funding alternatives, then yields on outstanding benchmark FHLB debt (traded by the same major dealers in the discount note selling group) should shift to reflect this same information. Specifically, we test whether auction size adjustments (announced at 11:36 AM) have any statistically significant impacts on observed changes in yields on 2-year, 5-year and 10-year FHLB notes between 9 AM and 1 PM. In unreported regressions, regardless of the definition of the independent variable, we find no evidence of a statistical relation between intraday changes in yields on longer-maturity FHLB debt and abnormal size.
For completeness, we also investigate whether any information contained in auction indications influences the FHLB's auction size adjustments. As described in Section 2, after collecting indications from the dealers by 11 AM, the Office of Finance calculates its own indications and communicates them to the twelve FHLB banks. The banks then submit their demanded quantities, which are summed by the Office of Finance to produce a final auction size at 11:36 AM. We test whether there is any relation between abnormal auction size and abnormal indications defined as changes in the indicated auction rate spread to Libor. We find no evidence of significant impacts of changes in indicated rates on auction size adjustments -only 5.5% of the estimated slope coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5% level and all Rsquares are essentially zero. We also estimated a VAR system of size adjustment and indicated spreads to Libor and performed Granger causality tests. Again, there is no evidence that changes in indicated auction rate spread to Libor influence the quantities auctioned by the FHLBs.
Robustness tests
We perform several robustness tests of the results in Tables 5 and 6 regressions are similar, although we lose some statistical significance on our proxy for arbitrage risk (as it becomes more positively correlated with the heterogeneity of investor beliefs variable).
We also estimate the regressions only on pre-2007 data and find that the effect of arbitrage risk remains statistically significant, though the effect of heterogeneity of investor beliefs becomes insignificant.
Second, our auction size adjustment variable presumes that dealers anchor their preauction rate indications on the mid-point of the Office of Finance's high and low size indications.
However, dealers may use other information, especially past auction size realizations, to condition their expectations of as-yet-to-be-announced auction sizes. As it happens, an eighthorder moving average process offers a reasonable statistical representation of the actual auction size data (results are very similar using fourth-or twelfth-order moving averages). In unreported results, we re-estimate the models in Table 5 with an auction size adjustment variable equal to the difference between the actual auction size and its predicted value based upon an eighth-order moving average process. The rate response estimates are qualitatively similar to those in Table 5 .
The overall fit of these regressions is worse than those of Table 5 -the adjusted R-squares are only about two-thirds of their Table 5 values, thus supporting our use of the mid-point of the Office of Finance's high and low size indications as an empirical proxy.
Third, to control for shifts in market conditions we add a time trend to all regressions.
The results are almost identical to the original specifications.
Fourth, we investigate whether the errors in our regressions suffer from serial correlation.
The Durbin-Watson statistics of the regressions range from 1.5 to 1.9, suggesting that serial correlation in the errors is not an important problem.
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Another factor that could affect demand elasticities for FHLB discount notes is the supply of competing debt instruments like commercial paper issued by financial institutions or US Treasury bills. Contemporaneous auctions of similar debt by other issuers might possibly increase the opportunity costs of holding FHLB paper by dealers and arbitrage-oriented traders and thereby decrease FHLB discount note auction demand elasticity. As a further unreported robustness check, we first add an interaction term between the daily issuance of financial commercial paper and auction size adjustment to the regressions in Table 5 . 18 The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant from zero and does not affect the coefficients on the remaining variables. We also collect data on auctioned amounts of similar-maturity Treasury bills and add an interaction term between Treasury bill issuance and auction size adjustment to the regressions in Table 5 . 19 Neither this approach nor the use of dummy variables to capture longer-term trends in Treasury bill issuance (e.g., dummies for low-issuance and high-issuance periods) could detect negative impacts of Treasury bill issuance on FHLB demand elasticities.
In addition, we address potential concerns about (i) the difference in timing between dealer indications and auction bids and (ii) violations of the dealers' truth telling and rational expectations assumptions. Recall from Section 2 that dealers submit indications as early as 9:30 AM, while they may submit their actual auction bids as late as 12:10 PM. It is possible that new information (besides the actual auctioned amounts) relevant for FHLB discount note pricing 18 We obtain data on daily commercial paper issuance volumes from the Federal Reserve Board. We map 20-40 day paper to the 4-week discount note auctions, 40-80 day paper to the 9-week, and greater than 80 days to the 13-week auctions. We sum the issuance on Monday and Tuesday (Wednesday and Thursday) and use that for Tuesday (Thursday) auctions of the same week.
released during this pre-auction interval affects auction results in a way that confounds our
estimates. In addition, we assume that the dealer indications are truthful and, via our imposition of rational expectations, incorporate all relevant market information as of the time they are submitted. We address concerns regarding these points by adding four more variables to the models in Tables 5 and 6: (1) the change in the FHLB Office of Finance rate indications from 9 a.m. to noon for window trades in discount notes of the same maturity; (2) the daily change in the implied swaption volatility (1-month-maturity options on 1-year swaps); (3) the daily change in VIX; and (4) the daily change in the spread of 3-month Libor relative to the 3-month Treasury bill rate.
Unreported results incorporating these four controls show that only the coefficient on the changes in window trade rate indications is statistically significant. The coefficients of interest and their significance levels in the original specifications of Tables 5 and 6 remain largely unchanged. These results suggest the any market "news" that occurs during the 9:30 AM to 12:10 PM interval is largely orthogonal to our included arbitrage risk and heterogeneity of investor beliefs variables. Furthermore, the statistical insignificance of other market measures such as implied swaption volatility, the VIX and Libor-Treasury bill rate spreads offers no evidence that rejects our maintained joint hypotheses of rational expectations and dealer truth telling for the dealer indications data.
Our estimates of elasticity assume that the demand curve for discount notes is linear across all auction sizes. However, there may be more complex responses of auction rates to large surprises in auction size. We explore this possibility in the context of a piecewise linear regression by adding interaction terms of the size adjustment variable with dummies for smallerthan-indicated and larger-than-indicated auction sizes. We report the results in Table 7 . When auction size is larger-than-indicated, the slope of the curve is not significantly steeper than the curve for as-indicated auctions. The smaller-than-indicated interaction term is positive and significant in all three specifications signifying a steeper demand curve over this auction size range. We attribute this result to more intense dealer competition when auction size is smallerthan-indicated.
<Insert Table 7 here>
Conclusion
The elasticity of demand for financial assets is a central element in asset pricing theory.
This paper provides empirical estimates of the demand elasticity of short-term debt instruments using Federal Home Loan Bank System discount note auction data. Specifically, we exploit the fact that for each auction this data includes both rate indications for an expected issuance level and the actual auction results in terms of rates and issuance amounts. This effectively provides the intraday variation in prices and quantities necessary to estimate the slope of the demand curve.
Our empirical results provide strong evidence of a nearly perfectly elastic market demand curve for FHLB discount notes. However, we also show that this demand elasticity fell significantly during the credit crisis that began in August 2007. Finally, we find that the crisisassociated fall in demand elasticity can be tied to market imperfections previously identified in the literature. Arbitrage risk and, to a lesser extent, the heterogeneity of investor beliefs are found to be statistically and economically important determinants of financial asset demand elasticity. The sample period starts in January1999 and ends in June 2008. Auctions for FHLB discount notes are held every Tuesday and Thursday. Auction size is determined shortly before bidding is opened as the sum of orders by each of the twelve FHLB banks for a particular maturity. Auctions are cancelled if there is no interest from any of the twelve FHLB banks in a particular discount note maturity. The sample period starts in January1999 and ends in June 2008. Only dealers that are members of the discount note selling group are allowed to bid at the auction. The number of dealers included in the selling group during the sample period ranges from 15 to 19. Cover ratio is calculated as the sum of the amounts of all submitted bids divided by the total auctioned amount. Number of dealers equals the number of unique dealers submitting bids at an auction. Number of bids equals the number of unique bids submitted at an auction. Award concentration equals the amount allocated to the five highest-priced individual winning bids in an auction. Auction Size Adjustment is the difference between actual auctioned amount and indicated amount. Crisis is an indicator variable equal to one for auctions held after August 1, 2007; zero otherwise. TE LIBOR equals the root mean squared error of regressions of changes in FHLB yields on LIBOR using 3-month rolling windows. Dealer Dispersion equals the standard deviation of the midpoints of dealer indications submitted on the day of the auction. High TE LIBOR is a dummy equal to one if TE LIBOR is in the top quartile of its sample distribution. High Dealer Dispersion is a dummy equal to one if Dealer Dispersion is in the top quartile of its distribution. We calculate n-day-to-maturity WAR Price as P = 100 × {1-[WAR × (n÷360]}. Indicated Price is calculated analogously using average Indicated Rate in place of WAR. White robust t-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. the difference between actual auctioned amount and indicated amount. Smaller than Indicated is a dummy equal to one if the actual auction size is smaller than the lower indicated size. Larger than Indicated is a dummy equal to one if the actual auction size is larger than the lower indicated size. Crisis is an indicator variable equal to one for auctions held after August 1, 2007; zero otherwise. TE LIBOR equals the root mean squared error of regressions of changes in FHLB yields on LIBOR using 3-month rolling windows. Dealer Dispersion equals the standard deviation of the midpoints of dealer indications submitted on the day of the auction. High TE LIBOR is a dummy equal to one if TE LIBOR is in the top quartile of its sample distribution. High Dealer Dispersion is a dummy equal to one if Dealer Dispersion is in the top quartile of its distribution. All regressions include fixed effects for auction maturity. t-statistics based on errors clustered by auction date are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Fig. 2 . Spread of 3-month FHLB discount note rate relative to 3-month Treasury bill rate and 3-month LIBOR in basis points (BP).
The data on 3-month FHLB discount notes is obtained from the Office of Finance and incorporates the outcomes of Discount Notes auctions, discount window sales and reverse inquiries. The 3-month T-bills data is obtained from FRED® at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/, while 3-month LIBOR is obtained from Bloomberg. This figure illustrates two market price-size equilibrium outcomes for two alternative auction size choices ("As Indicated" and "Large"). Companion bid curves are drawn for each auction size choice. The "Notional Demand Curve" is the Marshallian demand curve implied by the line determined by the starred equilibrium points. Arbitrage Risk equals the root mean squared error of regressions of changes in FHLB yields on LIBOR using 3-month rolling windows. Dispersion of Beliefs equals the standard deviation of the midpoints of dealer rate indications submitted on the day of the auction. Basis Points 01jan1999 01jan2000 01jan2001 01jan2002 01jan2003 01jan2004 01jan2005 01jan2006 01jan2007 01jan2008
Date Dispersion of Beliefs Arbitrage Risk
